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Abstract
Whitelisting IP addresses and hostnames allow organizations to employ a default-deny approach to
network traffic. Organizations employing a default-deny approach can stop many malicious threats, even
including zero-day attacks, because it only allows explicitly stated legitimate activities. However, creating
a comprehensive whitelist for a default-deny approach is difficult due to user-supplied destinations that can
only be known at the time of usage. Whitelists, therefore, interfere with user experience by denying network
traffic to user-supplied legitimate destinations. In this thesis, we focus on creating dynamic whitelists that
are capable of allowing user-supplied network activity. We designed and built a system called Harbinger,
which leverages user interface activity to provide contextual information in which network activity took place.
We built Harbinger for Microsoft Windows operating systems and have tested its usability and effectiveness
on four popular Microsoft applications. We find that Harbinger can reduce false positives-positive detection
rates from 44%-54% to 0%-0.4% in IP and DNS whitelists. Furthermore, while traditional whitelists failed to
detect propagation attacks, Harbinger detected the same attacks 96% of the time. We find that our system
only introduced six milliseconds of delay or less for 96% of network activity.
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1 Introduction
Cybercriminals make a profit by selling personal information on the Dark Web or using ransomware to
hold computing resources hostage until the victim pays the ransom. As a result, enterprises are lucrative
targets for malicious individuals because of their storage of a large amount of customer information and
their ability to pay ransom with liquid capital [27]. To protect against such threats, enterprises use intrusion
detection systems (IDS) and anti-virus software. Nonetheless, there are still monthly cyber-attacks on
enterprise networks that affect the lives of millions of people. For example, data breaches of Equifax, First
America, and Capital One each delivered more than 100 million people’s personal information to the hands
of malicious individuals [21, 5]. Furthermore, the data breaches combined with the fact that the average
dwell time, the duration of time a malware has undetected network access until removed, was 191 days in
2017 [11], the adversary has ample opportunity for corporate espionage. Despite enterprises using IDS and
anti-virus software and hiring proficient information technology (IT) staff, there is room for improvement in
both detection and prevention of cyber-attacks. In this thesis, we describe the design and construction of an
IDS tool, called Harbinger, which aims to improve the current detection rate of cyberattacks by using the
User Interface (UI) context associated with network traffic and offer more information for security decisions
about network connection.
The end-user’s predominant form of communicating their intentions to an application is through inter-
actions with a Graphical User Interface (GUI); as a result, we can conclude that GUI interactions act as a
precursor to user-driven process and network activity and provide a rich source of contextual information.
For example, a network connection from Microsoft Word to a printer would have a precursor UI context
of the “Print” button. Harbinger monitors the GUI activities of the end-user and uses this information in
conjunction with traditional network knowledge, such as IP address, port, and protocol to detect malicious
network activity. We developed a GUI monitor which tracks the user’s interaction with the GUI, such as
which buttons were clicked, which GUI widgets are currently in focus, mouse clicks, keystrokes, and the
associated application. Harbinger takes a fine-grained approach and is able monitor the behaviors of each
application with its network activity. Furthermore, using the observed behavior, which takes UI information
into account, we can restrict network connections to the intranet and the Internet.
In our previously mentioned “Print” example, the UI context “Print” is a prerequisite for network con-
nections to the printer. As a result, if a malware inside the enterprise attempts to connect to the printer, it
will fail unless the user presses the ”Print” button at the same time. On the other hand, a traditional IDS
will likely allow the network activity because the source and destination are trusted. We can say the same
for network activity to the Internet. Harbinger is also be able to predict network connections previously not
seen. For example, if the end-user clicks on a hyperlink www.example.com in Microsoft Word, a traditional
IDS may flag the connection as an anomaly, but Harbinger will not because it will detect that the user has
clicked on a GUI element with class type “link” and name “www.example.com.”
Harbinger records the GUI activity of applications for IT staff to consult in case of a breach. This
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information can also be more useful than simply having traditionally logged network activities. Traditional
log activity only includes network information such as protocol and port numbers, and an example of this
would be a Wireshark output. On the other hand, the log file Harbinger produces includes UI information
in addition to the traditional network information. In case of a breach, the IT staff, with access to UI
information, will be able to determine which application the user was interacting with and what interaction
took place.
Current enterprise network security tools such as firewalls and IDS rely on signature-based or anomaly-
based detection methods to inspect packet headers and payload to detect malicious network activity. Signature-
based IDS looks for specific pre-defined patterns, such as byte sequences, in network traffic to detect attacks.
In other words, the approach searches for malicious event spaces. Although a signature-based detection
approach can detect known attacks, it cannot detect unseen attacks, for which there are no pre-defined
signatures. Furthermore, with obfuscation techniques, such as payload encryption, the adversary can change
the signature of their attacks. Therefore, this approach does not easily adapt to new threats and intelligent
adversaries. Anomaly-based IDS monitors network activity and classifies the network behavior as either
normal or anomalous, which can be thought of as searching for unmalicious event space. In order to detect
anomalous or malicious behavior, the IDS first learns to recognize normal behavior, and most IDS employs
machine learning for this purpose. Anomaly-based IDS holds an advantage over signature-based IDS because
of its ability to detect new attacks for which there are no pre-defined signatures. However, the anomaly-based
approach suffers from false positives because it might mistake previously unknown legitimate network traffic
as malicious. Furthermore, both approaches are insufficient to stop mimicry attacks in which the adversary
attempts to mask malicious traffic as benign by trying to mimic normal network activity. In the event of a
breach, the forensic information from current tools is insufficient for understanding the attack; we can see
this from the number of major data breaches and the average dwell time, a duration of undetected access
an adversary has in a network. As a result, in this thesis, we describe design and construction of Harbinger
which aims to overcome these problems by using UI information.
Previous research related to the intersection of security and GUI activity has employed course-grained
approaches such as last time of use of the UI [13]. These are course-grained approaches, and an adversary
can time their attacks to coincide with UI activity. Approaches which rely solely on traditional knowledge
of network activities are also insufficient. These tools can be overcome when an adversary mimics legitimate
network activity, hijacks benign software, or obfuscates payload by encrypting it. Furthermore, such tools
falsely flag benign activity if it has not been seen before or appears to be an anomaly.
In this thesis, our research questions are: 1) To what extent can the UI activity be used to predict network
activity? and 2) To what extent can this information be used to improve network resource requests? We
passively monitor and acquire fine-grained UI contextual information surrounding a network request with
traditional network information to find out if UI information improves network security analysis. To test
our theory, we built an intrusion detection system which takes advantage of the UI and compared its true
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positive and true negative rates to a traditional firewall.
2 Related Work
We group the related work into four categories: intersection of GUI and security, GUI quality assurance,
intrusion detection systems (IDS), and JavaScript and web requests. We are building an IDS that leverages
UI information, hence an understanding of IDS systems and research on the intersection of GUI and security
is essential. Research concerning GUI quality assurance and JavaScript are not directly related to the topic
of this thesis, but they give useful background. Research related to GUI quality assurance can provide
insightful information regarding comprehensive and accurate monitoring of UI and research on JavaScript
can provide information on instrumenting browsers or give a general background information concerning
the topic. We require such information because browsers make automatic and irregular network requests
without UI interaction, unlike regular desktop applications.
2.1 Intersection of GUI and Security
Previous research in the field focusing on the intersection between GUIs and security have suggested using
mouse click and keyboard press counts to differentiate between users, using low system activity to infer
higher-level GUI activity, or requiring the customization of existing GUI functionality to monitor the end-
user. Binder [7] and Kwon [13] stated that malware operates in the background without interaction with
the UI; therefore, they tried to correlate user activities with the network activity immediately succeeding it.
However, they did not tie specific network destinations to UI activity or an application; as a result, their
approach is susceptible to mimicry attacks [35]. HoNe [9] correlated a process with its network activity but
did not consider UI activity preferring to focus on the process’ metadata solely. These approaches have
limited or no visibility into user activity of an application, thus making them coarse-grained. Harbinger
overcomes these deficiencies by linking specific UI activity of an application to a specific network destination
and limits the opportunities for an adversary to launch mimicry attacks. Bhukyaet et al. [4] studied mouse
and keyboard usage to differentiate between users on a machine. They monitored mouse clicks and keyboard
presses and used machine learning to build per-user profiles. They then applied the machine learning model
to detect malicious individual attempting to masquerade as a company employee on a company machine.
Even though they focused on insider threats, which is not in our threat model, Harbinger leverage user input
because of its utility.
UI activity has also been applied to access control of system resources and file management at the end
host. Polaris [34] tracked user activity to infer if a user wants software to access system resources such as the
camera and the network card. They achieved this by replacing an application’s GUI widgets with custom
widgets and monitoring the user activity using them. Shirley et al. [31] monitored whether a software tries to
gain access to files it has not created or does not have a history of accessing to detect malware. The approach
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requires persistent storage of an application’s access history of files since its installation for all application
is on the system. These approaches take advantage of the UI to infer user intent concerning access control
of system resources. However, they require the instrumentation or the replacement of existing functionality,
and the latter requires the indefinite maintenance of an application’s access history of files.
Lanzi et al. [14] did not directly monitor the user activity to infer user intention but inspected system
logs and system calls to infer user actions, such as opening an application. The approach not only adds
another layer of abstraction between user intention and the security decision but also has difficulty dealing
with interleaved system log and calls and incurs high-overhead monitoring system activity. Other research
has focused on matching UI input to network packets. Gyrus [12] used UI automation [18] to acquire user
input and matches those input with outgoing network packets to make sure the packets were unmodified.
However, Gyrus requires a VM host to implement secure overlays and assumes the packets are unencrypted.
These approaches are course-grained or require the instrumentation of existing functionality; as a result,
there currently are no approaches that can perform comprehensive GUI monitoring without significant
instrumentation of existing functionality of the GUI, which would hinder enterprise deployment.
2.2 GUI Quality Assurance
While not directly related to the thesis, research related to GUI testing gives insightful information regarding
the comprehensive and concise monitoring of GUI elements, activity, and the structure of the UI interface.
Research in this field has focused on the automatic generation of test cases for quality assurance purposes.
GUIRipper [16] used low-level function calls to reverse engineer the GUI structure and elements. Once
GUIRipper discovers an executable widget, GUIRipper executes the widget and saves the invoked window
for later, more in-depth exploration into the GUI. ReGUI [19] uses UI automation to acquire the structure and
elements of the GUI and uses guided exploration to explore the structure of the GUI fully. GUISurfer [33]
can generate the structural information regarding the GUI interface but requires the source code of the
application. Unlike the previous approaches, Sikuli [6] is not able to automatically explore the GUI structure.
Instead, it employs image recognition and a Python-based scripting language to enable the rapid prototyping
of GUI test cases. These approaches are unable to explore the changes in the GUI structure fully. Many are
resource-intensive or require access to the source code. This shows that full exploration of the UI for security
purposes will be challenging. However, passive acquisition of UI information while in use may be possible.
2.3 Intrusion Detection Systems
IDSes monitor network or application behavior for malicious activity or policy violation and they are classified
either according to their range in scope or detection mechanisms. IDSes systems can range in scope from
a single end-user system to large networks. Host-based IDSes (HIDS) are located at the end-user’s system
and is an example of an IDS monitoring a single end-user’s machine for malware. Network IDSes (NIDS)
are located at the perimeters of an enterprise network and monitors network traffic for malicious activity.
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Depending on the IDS’s location in the computing environment, they can have an in-depth view of the end
user’s machine or a holistic view of the entire computing environment. IDSes also can be divided according
to their detection approach, and the common variants are signature-based detection and anomaly-based
detection. In this section, we explore research related to IDS systems.
Bro [26] and Snort [29] are NIDSs which filter streams of network traffic into a series of events and
enforces policy scripts written in Bro policy language and Berkeley Packet Filtering commands, respectively.
Bro and Snort are both examples of NIDSs located at the end-host system that employ signature-based
detection mechanisms. Bro focuses more on building an NIDS system capable of handling large volumes
of network traffic with real-time notification and puts particular emphasis on the importance of separating
the policy engine from the rest of the NIDS. Bro states the separation results in smooth implementation
and extensibility of network policy. Snort stated that the slow release of new attack signatures by security
vendors creates a security risk. They aim to shore up the security risk by analyzing suspicious traffic at the
application layer and create policy rules instead of signatures (or hash values) to mitigate the risk. Harbinger
separates the policy engine and enforcement from the rest of the NIDS and uses a rule-based approach instead
of hash values as signatures. Lee et al. [15] constructed a NIDS similar to Bro, but it employed machine
learning algorithms to detect anomalies in network traffic. Yeung et al. [37] built a host-based IDS which
employed dynamic and static machine learning approaches to detect anomalies on the end host by observing
system calls and shell commands. While Harbinger does not take advantage of machine learning to build an
anomaly-detection based IDS, we consider it as part of our future work. Garfinkel et al. [10] built a hybrid
IDS isolated from the end host using virtualization. Garfinkel discussed the trade of between HIDS and
NIDS. Garfinkel stated that HIDS and NIDS trades visibility for security, with HIDS having a better view
than NIDS because it resided at the end-user’s machine while being more susceptible to attacks by malware
on that machine. To combat this, Garfinkel used virtualization to isolate the HIDS from the rest of the host
system and claims that such a measure makes the HIDS more secure without severely hampering visibility.
Harbinger does not use virtualization to isolate itself from the host system for security, but it does take the
same precautions as other commercial security tools.
2.4 Default Deny Policy
In this thesis, we seek to move from default-allow to default-deny NDIS policy approach. In the default-deny
approach, security tools deny program execution or network activity if they are not explicitly permitted.
They commonly implement this approach using a whitelist, which contains a list of permitted applications
or network behaviors. Whitelists have been used to deny malware execution on the end-user’s system both
in academic research and industrial use [11, 18]. While whitelisting program execution is different from
whitelisting network behavior, research related to program whitelisting sheds light on what difficulties we
may encounter while developing Harbinger.
Application whitelisting involves building an index of legitimate software that is permitted to be present
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and active on the end-user’s system. The purpose of the application whitelist is to protect the end-user’s
system from malware infection. The difficulty in creating whitelists lie in making a comprehensive whitelist
and updating it regularly to keep up with changes in user behavior. Codeshield introduced Personalized
Application Whitelisting (PAW) to overcome the difficulty in using a one-size-fits-all whitelist approach.
PAW creates custom whitelist of safe executables and only allows them to run. They claimed this approach
overcomes the inflexibility of a one-size-fits-all approach without requiring a security personal to configure
the whitelist. The problem with executable whitelists is that keeping the whitelists up-to-date is difficult
because the executable’s hash value can drastically change with a patch. In network whitelisting, this is not
a major issue because network activity should not change drastically without an update. However, network
whitelisting presents its challenges in the form of user-specified destinations that cannot be known prior. We
focus on solving this problem in this thesis.
2.5 JavaScript and Web Requests
While traditional application’s network behavior tends to be deterministic and predictable, a browser’s
network behavior is erratic and nondeterministic. Web pages contain hundreds of links, interconnectedness
to other websites, and JavaScript changes to the document object model (DOM). As a result, their behavior
is more complex than desktop applications, and changes are frequent. We, therefore, explore research papers
related to the dynamic exploration of JavaScript for quality assurance.
Research in this field focuses on monitoring the event space of a webpage, which is equivalent to monitoring
for changes in the DOM. The DOM represents the webpage as a logical tree, which includes the hyperlinks.
Therefore, monitoring for DOM changes alerts us to hyperlink changes. Artemis [2] is a JavaScript test
case generator which uses a feedback-directed random test generation prioritizing code coverage through
interactions with registered JavaScript events. Kudzu [30], similar to Artemis, combines random test case
generation to explore JavaScripts event space with a model for reasoning about JavaScript string values and
operations. Crawljax [17] uses a similar approach to explore the JavaScript event space to crawl dynamically
created links. However, it is still not known whether Artemis and Kudzu can explore JavaScript event spaces
fully. Crawljax further requires some invokable events to be user-specified.
3 Approach
Based on our observation, computer applications tend to have deterministic network behavior when there
is no interaction from the user or if the user is interacting with the application in a predetermined manner.
They establish connections to predictable destinations, which can be observed during application startup or
periodic checks for updates if the network activity resulted from the background activity of an application.
This is also true when the user is interacting with an application in a predetermined manner, meaning that
the user does not provide input that might affect the network destination. These destinations are hard-
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coded or are in a configuration file and, thus, deterministic. However, when users start providing network
destinations, such as inputting URLs, nondeterministic network activity is introduced. Creating an effective
whitelist is then difficult because such network activities are not in the baseline application behavior and
have not been observed before. Whitelists, therefore, start interfering with user experience and legitimate
network traffic by blocking user-specified network activity.
Prior work on whitelists have sought to integrate user interactions when making security decisions [7, 31,
13] to tackle the above problem. By understanding what the user intends to do, they sought to whitelist
only those activities which the user authorized. However, malicious agents have become more intelligent,
employing sophisticated mimicry attacks [35] blending in with legitimate activity. Due to the coarse-grained
approach of previous works of allowing network activity immediately following user activity, they give mali-
cious agents a chance to blend in.
In this section, we explain our threat model, the challenges we faced, and the design decisions made to
overcome those difficulties to make effective whitelists. In our endeavor, we have leveraged UI activity to
create dynamic whitelists that take into account both an application’s baseline and user-generated network
behavior. Our approach is more fine-grained than previous works able to monitor the user’s UI activity
precisely.
3.1 Threat Model
We assume that the adversary has already exploited a vulnerability in the host system and has user-level
privileges only. We made the previous assumption because the first step of exploitation is finding a vulner-
ability and achieving a foothold inside the enterprise network, regardless of the end goal. As a result, we do
not concern ourselves with the mode of exploitation for the initial phase of an attack, as the methods avail-
able to the adversary are numerous. For example, freely available exploitation tools, unpatched vulnerable
software installed on the computing base, and zero-day exploits are among many possible avenues of attack.
As a result, our threat model assumes a compromise will occur despite the best efforts by the defenders.s.
The assumption that the adversary only has user-level privileges is also in line with adversaries’ real-world
behavior [3] and the principle of least privilege (POLP) [8]. Once adversaries are inside the system, they
usually have user-level privileges only at the beginning and work their way up to acquire administrative priv-
ileges with advanced techniques or further propagate within the enterprise network. To gain administrative
privileges, adversaries usually download more capable malicious software from outside the enterprise. Such
an attempt would be detected by Harbinger, as explained in sections below.
With user-level privileges, the adversary can perform any actions permissible to a user-level process,
such as making arbitrary number of connections to any destination, starting and stopping other user-level
processes, reading and writing to files, and anything else that does not require administrative privileges. The
adversary will likely use these capabilities to make arbitrary outbound connections in the hopes of further
propagating within the local area network (organization) or to an outside command and control center to
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receive further instructions or download a more capable malware because being dormant inside the exploited
machine is not conducive to profitable outcomes such as stealing data from the exploited machine. Since the
adversary only starts with user-level privileges, he or she will be barred from activities that can tamper with
administrative level processes, files, and the kernel; as a result, we consider the administrative account and
the kernel to be in the Trusted Computing Base (TCB). This limitation of the adversary is not only realistic,
but in line with the assumptions made by host-based firewalls and anti-virus software because these defense
systems operate in the administrative level and can be terminated if the adversary acquires administrative
privileges.
The adversary may be aware of our intrusion detection system and its inner workings, including the
libraries and windows services Harbinger relies on, how information is collected, how the collected information
is used to make security decisions, which assumption Harbinger makes, and the privileges space Harbinger
runs with. This information is useful to the adversary because Harbinger runs with administrative privileges;
therefore, the adversary cannot directly stop Harbinger from running and would need an indirect method to
overcome the IDS we have developed.
Such attempts can be in the form of feeding false information to our system by using software-generated
UI activity or tampering with libraries Harbinger relies upon. Generating UI activity with software is
possible due to how mouse and keyboard activity are handled in the Windows operating system. Windows
applications are event-driven because they do not make explicit function calls to the operating system to
acquire user input, but wait for the operating system to notify them of user input in the form of a Windows
Message submitted to the application’s message queue. Furthermore, Windows Messages designating user
activity can be created not only by the operating system but by other applications as well. As a result, in our
threat model, the adversary could easily mimic user input with software. We rely on a framework provided
by the Microsoft Corporation to retrieve UI information of the applications under test. The framework
loads DLLs into processes that want to access UI information, and these DLLs perform UI information
acquisition and transmission. The DLLs associated with the framework may be replaced or modified by
the adversary. We have taken precautions against such threats, through the usage of drivers and DLL
checkers, and in the case, our approach is not enough, previous research done by trusted computing and
virtualization communities have explored methods to place UI widgets inside the TCB to protect from
malicious applications tampering with the GUI.
The goal of Harbinger is to move from a blacklist, default-allow policy, to a usable whitelist, a default-
deny policy. When blacklists are used, all connections are allowed except for the ones that are in the
blacklist. These blacklists contain the IP addresses or host names of destinations that have previously
exhibited malicious behavior. This approach can be unreliable when the adversary uses a clean IP address
or host name. This situation is not uncommon as the adversary can buy new IP addresses or hostnames, or
commandeer an unwilling third party’s machine for malicious usage. Due to these drawbacks, we investigate
the feasibility of whitelist-based default-deny policy. Our system only allows a connection if the connection
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was observed as baseline behavior (traditional whitelist) or the network connection was caused by GUI
activity (e.g., clicking on a URL). We assume the defender is working in an enterprise setting with the
capability to install Harbinger on all machines under care. Our approach can be used in conjunction with
other tools such as anti-virus software, anomaly detection software, and blacklists. We assume all user actions
are legitimate and performed with nonmalicious intent in mind. As a result, we do not protect against social
engineering, phishing, and insider threats, as these attacks require user participation.
3.2 UI Workflows as a Precursor to Network Activity
User interfaces facilitate the interaction between the user and the machine. They are where user intent turns
into machine action, whether that be accessing a file, running a program, or generating a network activity.
End users have the choice of interacting with a machine by choosing from multiple user interfaces, including,
but not limited to, the command-line user interface, voice user interface, and graphical user interface. From
the list of possible user interfaces, the graphical user interface is the most popular, and all major operating
systems provide one.
The machine action resulting from interactions with the GUI occurs temporally later than their corre-
sponding UI activity. We believe monitoring the UI will provide the necessary contextual information for
inferring the legitimacy of the resulting network activity, allowing us to move towards a whitelist-based
intrusion detection system. For example, when the end-user clicks on the print button in Microsoft Word,
the application makes network connections to the printer. Clicking on the print button, a GUI action, led
to the application making a connection to the printer, a network activity. Monitoring the graphical user
interface, therefore, can act as a precursor to network activity. The purpose of Harbinger is to collect and
associate such data.
3.3 Design of Harbinger
In order to associate GUI and network activity, Harbinger must monitor GUI activity and intercept network
traffic and find a way to associate them. Due to the multiple responsibilities’ of Harbinger, we have divided
it into three major components: the application monitor, the controller, and the policy engine as shown in
Figure 1. They are responsible for monitoring user activity, approving or denying connections, and generating
policy, respectively. The application monitor resides in the client machine to monitor and save user activity,
and upon request, transmit the data to the controller. The controller resides on a remote server, and it is
responsible for approving or denying a connection based on policies saved in a database with information
provided by the application monitor. The policy generation is currently conducted offline with the usage of
a Python script and training data.
Figure 1 also shows an example scenario of Microsoft Word printing a document. Without Harbinger,
Microsoft Word will immediately process the user input and send a request over the network to the printer.
With Harbinger, we intercept network requests (lines 3 and 4 in Figure 1) with the Network Monitor and
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Figure 1: By default the application communicates directly with the destination. However, the outbound
communication is intercepted by the centralized access controller and the UI context is retrieved from the
UI Monitor. The centralized access controller allow the connection if a matching policy is found.
query the Application Monitor for the associated GUI data (lines 1 and 2 in Figure 1). The Network monitor
then packages the network and GUI data and sends it over to the Policy Engine for a security decision (lines
5 and 6 in Figure 1). While waiting for a decision, the packets are queued by the Network Monitor. If the
request is approved (lines 9 and 10 in Figure 1), all queued packets are re-injected for transmission (lines 11,
12, and 13 in Figure 1). We explain the implementation of each component in detail in Section 4.
3.4 UI Workflows and Network Activity
Contextual UI information is useful when they are unique, fine-grained, because it allows our system to
accurately monitor and differentiate a user’s actions when interacting with an application. However, if GUI
contextual information is not sufficiently fine-grained, there is room for confusion and error. For example, if
our system cannot differentiate between a “Print” button, which causes a network activity, and a document
named “Print,” which does not cause a network activity, the lack of differentiation is a possible security hole
the adversary can take advantage of. The adversary may time their malicious activity shortly after the end
user clicks on a document named “Print.” In such a situation, if there is no way to differentiate between the
“Print” button and the document named “Print,” we cannot make an informed decision. As a result, the
UI information we collect must be sufficiently fine-grained to differentiate between them. Furthermore, our
collection mechanism must not only be fine-grained, but extensive in its capability to acquire UI information
from a variety of applications. Besides the point that UI-aware system would need to be able to collect
UI information from the various applications the end-user interacts with, the extensive collection of UI
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Date: Sept. 10, 2018 at 9:54:17am
Source: [ANONYMIZED IP], port 49795, Host Name: [ANONYMIZED]
Destination: 93.184.216.34, port 443, Host Name: example.com
Protocol: TCP [SYN flag set]
Application: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE
User: [ANONYMIZED_DOMAIN]\[ANONYMIZED USER]
Keystrokes (5 s, 15 s, 60 s, 3 m, 5 m): 0, 34, 34, 34, 34
Mouse Click (5 s, 15 s, 60 s, 3 m, 5 m): 5, 5, 6, 8, 8
User Interface (231ms ago):
Name: Document1 - Word, Class: OpusApp, Control: window
| Name: [none], Class: _WwF, Control: pane
| | Name: Document1, Class: _WwB, Control: pane
| | | Name: Document1, Class: _WwG, Control: document
| | | | Name: Page 1, Control: page
| | | | | Name: Page 1 content, Control: edit
| | | | | | Name: https://example.com, Control: hyperlink
Figure 2: Example trace from Harbinger while using the Microsoft Word application. Keyboard and moue
activity are binned in cumulative time buckets of varying size. The GUI data is shown in a tree format from
the root of the application to the actuated widget and with relative time since actuation. The GUI data also
shows the class and control type of the GUI widgets.
information further increases the ability to differentiate between UI activity. For example, there is no easy
way to differentiate between the “Print” button in Microsoft Word and the “Print” button in Microsoft
Excel because the UI element in both cases is nearly identical. This can be overcome not only if we perform
the GUI collection on the activated “Print” button, but also extend the collection to the parent GUI element
and to its ancestors. We can then differentiate the print buttons as belonging to different applications, one
to Microsoft Word and the other to Microsoft Excel.
To represent the relation between GUI and network activity, we define a trace: the union of UI workflow,
user input, and the resulting network activity. For example, {Application1, (a, b, c, d), inputs} →
{ connection1:time1, connection2:time2 }. In this case, Application could be Microsoft Word; a, b, c,
d are GUI workflows, each composed of multiple widgets; and connection: time1 are the IP address and the
time in which the connection was made respectively.
Our system produced a more expressive example when the user typed https://example.com and clicked on
it in Microsoft Word. This example presents a UI activity and the associated network connection. Figure 2
shows the trace the activity of the user in terms of keystrokes, mouseclicks, GUI widget information, GUI
16
hierarchy, the application’s executable path, the current logged in user, and traditional network information,
including the IP addresses, host names, ports, and protocols. The trace was produced by Microsoft Word,
when the end-user typed 34 characters and clicked 8 times in the last 5 minutes. The keyboard and mouse
activity included typing https://example.com in the Word document body (automatically converted to a
hyperlink) and clicking on the hyperlink, which resulted in network activity to https://example.com. The
UI activity occurred 241 milliseconds before the associated network activity.
The trace formalism provides inherent support for a dynamic whitelist based approach. First, the trace
formalism supports traditional whitelist policy, such as activities based on hardcoded destinations of the
application (e.g., application to updated server) or to enterprise-configured destinations (e.g., email servers).
In such cases, we would ignore the UI and user inputs fields because they do not affect the network activity.
For such policies, we would provide the destinations as IP address or DNS host names. Second, the trace
formalism supports variability in network behavior. For example, due to DNS caching, which is when an
application saves DNS lookups temporarily for future use, the number of connections to a destination may
vary. When an application first visits a remote destination, the application performs a DNS lookup and
caches it, but on the second visit, the DNS lookup is skipped because it is in cache (temporary memory). As
a result, the number of network connections differs. Computation load balancing also causes the temporal
distance between a UI action and associated network activity to vary. For example, consider a machine
only running the Chrome browser versus a machine concurrently running the Chrome browser and Microsoft
Word. In the former has more computational resources are available for Chrome. As a result, UI interactions
and the associated network activity will occur temporally closer in the first case than the second one. These
variabilities can be accommodated with trace counters, which count both the number of consecutive traces
to the same destinations and time bounds. Last, the trace can be self-referential, which is essential for
dynamic whitelists. If the end-user initiates a connection to a destination by accessing a URL or IP address,
the URL or IP address will appear in the UI field of the trace. We can dynamically whitelist a previously
unseen destination if the host name or the IP address appears in the associated UI field.
Figure 3 illustrates the policy that the UI field must contain the destination host name or IP address as
a substring to allow the connection. This policy would even allow any destination accessed by a hyperlink
to be whitelisted even without knowing the destination in advance.
3.5 Monitoring the Graphical User Interface
Using GUI activity to predict low-level system activity (such as network activity) requires complete and
comprehensive monitoring of the user’s interaction with the GUI. This must occur in a timely manner,
regardless of the application the user is interacting with or the operating system running on the machine. To
achieve this goal, there are three possible approaches: instrumentation of each application on each operating
system, the instrumentation of GUI libraries, or a specially designed library supported on most operating
systems. Furthermore, the user’s interaction with the UI must be obtained before the application processes
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Destination IP: *,
Destination Host: $1,
Destination Port: 443,
Protocol: TCP [SYN flag],
Application Path: C:\Program Files (x86)\
Microsoft Office\root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE,
Mouse Clicks/Keystrokes: 1+ in last 5 seconds,
GUI: .*https://([a-zA-Z0-9\-]+)/\s*, Control: hyperlink.*,
Action: ALLOW
Figure 3: Example policy rule to allow the traffic matching the trace in Figure 2. We use regular expressions
to handcraft a policy which encompasses hyperlink traffic.
the request, meaning that Harbinger would need to intercept requests before the user’s action reaches the
application. If we do not intercept the user’s action, we would encounter a race condition in which the
application makes the network request before Harbinger has the chance to acquire the associated GUI data.
Instrumentation refers to the action of adding additional code for the purpose of monitoring an appli-
cation for performance measurements, diagnosing errors, and producing behavioral logs. In our case, we
instrument the application under test to log the user interaction with the application’s GUI. The first ap-
proach, instrumenting each application on each operating system to retrieve the GUI information of the
application, would require a significant amount of work due to the number of applications used by enter-
prises. For example, we would need to instrument Microsoft Word to detect when the user interacts with
the application, which specific UI widget the user interacts with, and the type of interaction. Just from
a cursory glance, it is obvious that significant engineering effort is required to log the UI interaction of a
single application, and we would need to repeat the process for every single application the enterprise uses.
Furthermore, instrumentation requires us to have access to the source code or at least some knowledge of the
application’s inner working, because we cannot instrument the application without knowledge of which part
of the application to modify or monitor. This would not be an issue if all applications were open-source (i.e.,
source code freely available), but this is not the case with Microsoft Office products’ and other applications’
source code being proprietary.
The second approach, instrumenting GUI libraries, is easier since applications share libraries among them,
but this approach still requires a significant amount of work because there are quite a few UI libraries for
each operating system and programming language (e.g., Chromium Embedded Framework, CEGUI, GTK+
for C, C++, Swing, JavaFx, SWT for Java, and Kivy for python). These libraries are a fraction of the UI
libraries available to developers. Not only must we instrument each library, but we must also contend with
the same issue as the first approach, mainly that the UI libraries can also be proprietary.
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The third approach is the one we select. We use a specially-designed library supported on most operating
systems that is capable of complete and comprehensive monitoring of the user’s interaction with the GUI,
regardless of the application under test, thereby overcoming the major issues of the first two approaches.
We develop one instrumentation that works across applications and UI libraries, bypassing the need to
have access to their source code. The framework which meets our demands is UI Automation, which is an
accessibility framework provided by Microsoft. UI Automation is able to acquire the hierarchical relationship
between GUI elements and the properties of each element such as its name, class, and content type of the
GUI element. UI Automation is supported on all Windows operating systems since Windows XP and works
with all applications and browsers not developed in Java. In the future, we will use the Java Accessibility
Framework [25] to cover Java applications running on the Windows operating system.
When a user is interacting with an application, we intercept the GUI information before the application
receives the user input, such as mouse clicks and key presses. This condition must be fulfilled because we
use UI information as a prerequisite for network activity, so the UI information must be available before the
network activity occurs. If we acquire the UI information after the application processes the user input, the
resulting network activity occurs without the corresponding UI information. When analyzing the network
activity, we would then be working with an empty UI field or with outdated UI information, and possibly
make an incorrect judgement. We therefore use Windows hooking to intercept mouse clicks and keyboard
presses and with the aid of UI Automation, retrieve the GUI information before the application receives the
user input. In short, Windows hooking allows us to insert our own subroutine between the user input and
application; we explain it in further in Section 4 of the thesis.
Some applications separate the GUI and network operations into different processes or services; thus,
our system bundles the application’s related processes in order to associate the UI and network activity.
The Chrome browser for example, spawns multiple processes in the following categories: Renderer, GPU,
Plugin, and Browser. A Renderer process is responsible for anything inside a tab where a website is displayed
while the Browser process is responsible for the application as a whole including privileged activities such as
network requests. As a result, we must associate UI information of the Renderer process with the network
request of the Browser process. Otherwise, the prerequisite UI field will be empty when the browser makes
a network request.
In the interest of performance, the GUI information is compressed with Huffman compression and saved
in a linked list. UI Automation provides UI contextual information as a wide string, and each UI element can
run as long as 100 characters or more with a single wide character taking sixteen bits in memory. As a result,
UI information storage and transmission in string format is inefficient, so we compress the UI information
with Huffman compression. Huffman compression is a lossless data compression technique which compresses
data with symbol-to-symbol replacement, with frequent symbols replaced with short encoding, and rare
symbols with a long encoding. In our case, the symbol is UI contextual information of a single UI element
and the encoding is a two byte binary encoding. The compression performs well when the frequency of the
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compressed elements is known. In our case, UI information is repeated frequently, because most users only
interact with a subset of available UI widgets and, as a result, the compression technique best fits our need.
The collected and compressed information is sent to a centralized access control server each time a network
request is made.
Our approach must not only collect UI contextual information in real-time, but also check its validity.
The adversary can compromise our system through deception or with an attack on the dependencies of the
IDS itself. Some software can simulate keystrokes and mouse clicks, so it is necessary to differentiate between
software-generated and hardware-generated user input. The attacker can also replace the UI Automation
library with a fake one that returns false information. To combat these software-generated attacks, we
differentiate between hardware and software-generated inputs. To achieve this, we monitor the mouse and
keyboard activity at the kernel space and the administrative space separately. To do so, we install a mouse
and keyboard driver that monitors user input at the kernel level and compare the activity to mouse and
keyboard activity at the administrative level. Our system also ensures that applications have loaded the
correct DLL for UI Automation by checking the path of the UI Automation DLLs loaded. An adversary
may try to terminate the IDS, so we run major components of the IDS with administrator privileges.
3.6 Policy Generation
We develop three different types of policies to differentiate between benign and malicious network traffic:
1) baseline behavior policy, which accounts for background network activity independent of user behavior;
2) UI activity policy, which accounts for network activity to predefined destinations caused by end-user
behavior; and 3) handcrafted dynamic behavior policy, which account for network activity to user-specified
destinations, such as those caused by URLs.
The first two policy types, baseline and UI activity, are similar: they both result in network activity
to predefined destinations. We can create policies for both cases by observing past behavior, because the
destinations of the network activity do not change often and remain constant for a relatively long period.
As a result, we can expect the same user behavior or lack thereof to result in the same network activity
observed in the past. To create the policies for the first type, a simple script will suffice. The first type
of policy accounts for background network activity independent of user behavior to predefined destinations
that are hardcoded in the application’s source code. For example, when a user launches Microsoft Word,
it automatically checks Microsoft-owned servers for updates. To develop these types of policies, we observe
the network activity of applications when there is no interaction with the end-user.
The second type of policy accounts for network activity to predefined destinations resulting from the
end-user’s interaction with the application. These interactions have increased along with the complexity of
modern applications, due to richer UI interfaces. For example, in Microsoft Word, the Wikipedia widget, the
Smart Lookup button, and the Thesaurus button connect to destinations predefined by Microsoft Word. As
a result of predefined destinations, we can develop UI activity policies by observing network activity when
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the user is interacting with the application.
The last type of policy requires special care due to user-specified destinations, so we handcraft them. The
dynamic behavior policy is different from the baseline policies, because we cannot expect the same activity
or similar activities to lead to network destinations observed in the past. Therefore, we cannot use the
same approach used for the first two types of policies and would need to develop custom policies by hand.
This does not mean that observing similar behavior is not beneficial. For example, assume, in Microsoft
Word, that we observed the UI activity of the user clicking on www.google.com and the resulting network
activity. We then observe the user clicking on www.facebook.com and the resulting network activity. These
two activities are not the same, and we cannot use a simple script to develop the policy for such an activity,
but they are similar nonetheless. The UI activity of clicking on a link is the same in both cases, and the
resulting network activity is to hosts that are present in the UI activity. Thus, we create a handcrafted
policy to generalize hyperlink activities that occur as a result of the user clicking on a link in Microsoft
Word shown in Figure 3. Creating such a generalized policy would not have been possible without sufficient
observation of similar activities. We explain how we create the three types of policies in further detail in the
implementation section of the thesis.
3.7 Data Generation
To generate the training and test data for the experiment, we used Sikuli [6] and DLL injection [1]. The
data generation can be done manually by end-users in the form of experiment participants or with software
that emulates user behavior. The first approach closely resembles actual usage in an enterprise setting,
but is challenging: it is laborious and requires significant human hours to collect large amounts of data.
We, therefore, generate the data using software that emulates user behavior. To emulate a compromised
application, we inject a mock-malicious DLL which is capable of making network connections that can be
considered malicious.
We chose Sikuli, a GUI testing framework, to emulate end-user interactions with the application’s UI.
Sikuli uses visual recognition to detect GUI objects on the screen and simulates mouse clicks and keyboard
presses to test an application’s GUI. We developed workflows, a sequence of UI actions such as clicking
on buttons and typing sentences. We developed some workflows which generate network traffic and some
workflows which do not, and we further randomized the order and timing between workflows to more closely
resemble a user’s nonlinear behavior when interacting with the UI. Some examples of workflows are: the
print document workflow, search a keyword workflow, and search for a Wikipedia article workflow. When we
conduct experiments, we chose workflows at random. To simulate the malicious behavior of an adversary, we
used DLL injection to inject a mock-malicious DLL into the application’s process space and run it. Thus, we
enabled the mock-malicious DLL to run with the application’s credentials and UI context. We ran workflows
a certain number of times to generate training and test data, and we only injected the malicious DLL when
we generated the test data.
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We did not use human subjects because it has significant drawbacks. First, using human subjects does not
allow us to test the validity of our approach despite closely resembling a usage in an enterprise setting. Our
approach assumes that all activity observed in the test data occurred in the training data. This assumption
must hold because we use the training data to create policies which predict the behavior in the test data.
As a result, if the test data contains UI activity that causes network traffic and is not present in the training
data, we cannot evaluate our approach fairly. When human subjects generate training and test data, they
can make small mistakes, such as clicking on the wrong widget. These small mistakes create new traces in
the test data, making us unable to test the validity of our approach. Second, interacting with the UI and
repeating specific actions is labor-intensive for the subjects and requires significant human hours to collect a
meaningful amount of data. For example, to print a document in Microsoft Word, the subject interacts with
three different widgets from Word’s homepage. The subject would need to carry out the “print document”
scenario dozens of times for us to collect enough data to create a firm policy that covers edge cases. We
have many scenarios like the “print document” scenario for each application under test, which makes human
subjects undesirable for our approach. Based on these considerations, we decided to use software to emulate
user behavior.
3.8 Browser
We do not use the same approach as desktop applications with browsers because of a browser’s ability to load
web pages and the numerous network connections it makes. Each webpage a browser loads can be thought
of as a single unique application because it is executing code provided by the server. As a result, if we
profile web applications, we would have to profile each website individually as we do with applications. This
profiling would need to be done regularly because, unlike desktop applications, web developers can easily
change web pages. However, this is not possible because of the numerous webpages the user might visit,
and, as a result, we would need to perform the training phase to create policies for each website. This is
impractical in real life. Furthermore, handcrafting policies for websites is difficult because network behavior
among sites is not consistent. As a result, we cannot feasibly craft a generic policy to handle all websites.
For example, facebook.com mostly contains hyperlinks to other Facebook domains, but low-traffic personal
sites may include hyperlinks to a multitude of other domains. Furthermore, most sites contain hundreds of
links and can change daily. As a result, we develop a different approach for browsers.
Since it is not possible to predict browser behavior based on past activity or handcraft policies for it, we
approach the problem by constructing the policies dynamically. The links within a webpage are requested
after the browser loads the webpage. As a result, intercepting the webpage before the browser has a chance
to process it will allow us to predict what the browser will request when the webpage is loaded. To achieve
this, we can intercept the webpage at the user level with browser plugins or at the kernel level with the
Windows Filtering Platform (WFP). Using browser plugins to analyze the Document Object Model (DOM)
of a webpage and extracting the links requires us to create plugins for every browser on the market. While
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this is possible, browser plugins run at the same privilege space as the browser itself. For example, if a user
launches the browser with user privileges, the plugin will also have user privileges. It is therefore possible to
compromise the plugin in our threat model. The loaded webpage itself can be compromised at the end-user’s
machine if an adversary injects links to the webpage. As a result, even though browser plugins are capable
of intercepting the webpage, it is not secure under our threat model. On the other hand, WFP runs in
kernel space and is capable of intercepting browser traffic. WFP allows us to access the packet processing
and filtering pipeline of the IP/TCP stack. We use Application Layer Enforcement (ALE) portion of the
WFP to intercept the TCP packets, which enables us to monitor network traffic at the per-connection or
per-socket level and monitor TCP and UDP socket operations. We register callout functions in our network
driver to that is notified when TCP packets are in flight.
Once we intercept the webpage, the links are extracted to create a policy. For example, the policy can
be a general one that allows connections to the domain names of the hyperlinks found in the webpage.
The engineering effort required for this approach is significantly more than creating browser plugins due to
working in the kernel space, but it is secure under our threat model. As a result, we have settled on this
approach to create a live policy mechanism for browsers.
4 Implementation
4.1 Application monitor
The application monitor must be comprehensive in its ability to acquire UI contextual information, regardless
of operating system or application, and precise in its ability to monitor user activity such as keystrokes and
mouse clicks. The implementation must be capable of intercepting user activity before the application. It
must also know which application the user is interacting with.
4.1.1 UI context
Acquisition of UI context must be universal and accurate. We have considered three possible approaches:
1) instrumentation per application, 2) instrumentation of UI libraries, and 3) a dedicated API which fulfills
the requirements. As described above in Section 3, the instrumentation of each application or individual UI
library is labor-intensive, so we have opted to use UI Automation, the accessibility framework provided by
Microsoft [18]. Microsoft developed UI Automation to support programmatic access to UI elements on the
desktop for accessibility purposes, enabling technology such as screen readers. UI Automation is capable of
acquiring information from UI elements/widgets, such as name, class type, control type, and the hierarchical
information of UI widgets. All Windows operating systems since Windows XP support the framework, and
the framework is compatible with all applications except those developed in Java. UI Automation represents
the totality of the UI interface of the operating system as a tree data structure, with the desktop widget
as the root element and all applications and other important control elements, such as the Windows widget
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and the search bar, as its children. Using the previously mentioned capabilities of UI Automation, we can
differentiate between widgets using their position in the hierarchy and their properties.
The basic building block of UI Automation is the IUIAutomationElement object, which represents a
single UI widget in Windows operating systems that have a multitude of properties including, but not
limited to, the name of the element, the class type, and the control type. The IUIAutomationElement
offers a multitude of properties, but for our purposes, the name, class type, and control type properties
are enough to differentiate between UI elements. Further IUIAutomationElement properties can be used
to differentiate between elements, but they are more general. These properties do not vary significantly
among UI elements and are not descriptive of the UI element. Further, the retrieval of multiple properties
can slow down the machine. As a result, we limit ourselves to the previously specified three properties to
fulfill the fine-grained requirement. The IUIAutomationElement object does not offer any way to traverse
the UI tree or to acquire a specific UI element. As a result, we use other classes in the framework to
traverse the UI tree. To acquire a starting point to traverse the UI tree, we use three methods in the
framework: GetRootElement, GetElementFromPoint, and GetFocusedElement. These methods retrieve the
root UI widget, the UI widget at the coordinates under the mouse pointer, or the currently focused UI widget
respectively. We use IUIAutomationTreeWalker, a class which exposes methods to walk through the UI tree,
to acquire the parent or the children of a UI widget provided the IUIAutomationElement object of the UI
widget. Using these methods, our implementation is capable of acquiring the properties of the widgets the
user has interacted with and traversing the UI tree from said element.
4.1.2 UI Activity
Users interact with the UI of applications primarily through the mouse and keyboard. Harbinger intercepts
these events and extracts the necessary information, such as the coordinates of the mouse click before the
application receives the user input. In the Windows operating systems, applications with GUIs are event-
driven and must have message queues that process Windows messages meant for the application’s GUI.
Whenever a mouse or a keyboard event occurs in Windows, the operating system creates and sends a
Windows message to the application currently in possession of the UI focus. As a result, our Application
Monitor must intercept Windows messages pertaining to mouse and keyboard events.
Luckily, Windows offers a method to intercept these messages by using hooks. A hook allows us to register
our subroutine to monitor Windows-message traffic in the Windows message-handling mechanism for certain
types of messages. In Harbinger, we register two separate hooks for the mouse and the keyboard. The mouse
hook is responsible for monitoring mouse click-down events, while the keyboard hook is responsible for key-
down events. We register hooks with the SetWindowsHookEx function, which takes four parameters; the
most important two are the first and second parameters, which take the identifier of the hook, which specifies
the hook type, and a pointer to the function to call when the hook event occurs. For example, we register
the mouse hook with the MOUSE LL identifier and a pointer to the function to call in the event of a mouse
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click. Furthermore, the registered hook can not only differentiate between different mouse events such as
left mouse down and right mouse up, but can also access the coordinates of the mouse. In the case of the
keyboard hook, the hook provides the specific pressed key.
4.1.3 Inner Workings of the Application Monitor
Using UI Automation and hooks, Harbinger can monitor the user’s interactions with the UI comprehensively
and accurately. The following is a detailed description of the inner workings of the Application Monitor.
When a user clicks on a UI element, our registered mouse hook checks whether the Windows message is a
button-down message. If so, the mouse hook acquires the coordinates of the mouse pointer, and using the
GetElementFromPoint functionality of UI Automation, acquires the UIAutomationElement object of the
widget. Once the UIAutomationElement object is acquired, we retrieve the name, class type, control type,
and process ID of the UI widget using the object’s methods and save it in a custom data structure with the
timestamp of the click event. However, there is a possibility that multiple widgets with the same properties
exist both within and across applications. As a result, to differentiate such widgets, we iterate over the
widget’s ancestors until the root UI element and perform the same action on them. We save the retrieved
information of the element and its ancestors in a custom data structure. Furthermore, we connect the custom
data structure of the ancestors via a pointer, set the activated widget’s data structure as the root, and push
the root structure into a vector for storage and easy retrieval of UI information. The custom data structure
has a wide string field for storing UI information, integer field for storing process ID, high-resolution time
point field for storing timestamp, and a pointer field for storing a pointer to its parent.
In the case of keyboard events, a similar approach is inefficient. Keyboard events are numerous when the
user is editing text, and populating structures consecutively with the same information is a poor utilization
of computing resources. As a result, Harbinger takes a different approach utilizing UI Automation’s event
handler for UI focus change events. As the name suggests, this event handler is triggered when the focused
UI changes, whether from one application to another application or from one widget to another widget
within the same application. When a keyboard key is pressed down, the keyboard hook first checks whether
a focus change event has occurred. If so, the keyboard hook performs the same actions as the mouse hook,
except this time, it starts from the focused UI element. We acquire the IUAutomationElement object with
GetFocusedElement method, which returns the currently focused UI widget. We made this change because
the user is navigating the UI with the keyboard and not the mouse. However, if a focus change event did
not happen, the user is likely editing text and not interacting meaningfully with the UI. In such a case, we
update the timestamp of the last structure added to the vector of structures. We save UI information in a
vector of structures with the most recent widget added to the beginning of the vector.
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4.1.4 Validity of UI Activity and Context
An adversary may provide false UI contextual information or generate UI activity through software, but
the Application Monitor (AM) takes precautions against such attacks. For an adversary to provide false UI
information, they would have to compromise UI Automation. As a result, the adversary would either have
to compromise the AM or the application under monitor (AUM).
UI Automation loads its libraries into both the AM and the AUM at the time of usage. As a result,
in order to compromise the validity of the UI information the AM collects, the adversary can replace the
UI Automation libraries with malicious libraries. UI Automation differentiates applications as client and
provider and loads different libraries into each. The client application, in our case, the AM, is the application
that requests the UI information from another application, and the application which returns the requested
information is the provider, the AUM. As the roles of the applications differ, the libraries they load are
different. The client and the provider both load UIAutomationTypes.dll and UiAutomationCore.dll, and
the client and the provider are required to load UIAutomationClient.dll and UIAutomationProvider.dll,
respectively.
An adversary may try to replace the UI Automation DLLs with malicious ones before the AM, or the AUM
loads the libraries. To mitigate this risk, we check if the AM and the AUM loaded UI Automation libraries
from the directories C:\Windows\, C:\Program Files\, and C:\Program Files (x86)\, which all require
administrative privileges to alter, which the adversary lacks under our threat model. Furthermore, these
directories are the default directories for UI Automation DLLs. To accomplish this task, the AM first acquires
the AUM’s process ID with a method from UI Automation, then, with the CreateToolHelp32Snapshot
function, the AM lists all DLLs that the AUM loads and their corresponding directories. If the AUM loads
UI Automation libraries from suspicious directories, it is apparent. We use the same procedure to validate
UI Automation libraries in the AM. We validate UI Automation libraries in the AM and AUM only once
during startup and first interaction, respectively. We save the verified process IDs in a vector so that we do
not validate them more than once.
The adversary may also try to create false UI activity by generating mouse clicks and key presses using
software. The adversary can achieve this by using tools such as Sikuli, a GUI testing tool, to mimic user
behavior. We use Sikuli to generate the training and test data for our security evaluation, and we find that
Windows hooks are unable to differentiate between hardware-generated and software-generated mouse and
keyboard activity. As a result, we add mechanisms to differentiate between hardware and software generated
user activity to the AM. We have created two drivers, one for the mouse and one for the keyboard. These
drivers record which keyboard keys and mouse buttons were pressed, and save them in a linked list in the
kernel space, with the most recent key pushed to the back of the list. When the hooks detect a mouse click or
keyboard press, the AM checks if the corresponding mouse or keyboard activity was observed by the drivers,
by requesting the most recent mouse click or keyboard press from the drivers. The AM compares the user
input observed by the hook against user input observed by the driver. As a result, if a mismatch occurs, the
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AM can detect the incongruity and alert the user.
4.1.5 Bundling of processes and services
Modern applications are no longer composed of only a single process, but spawn multiple processes for
different purposes, as in the example of the Chrome browser we gave in Section Three. Thus, an application
may decide to delegate its GUI and network functionalities to separate processes. In such a case, the AM
cannot retrieve an application’s GUI information because the process ID of the GUI and the process ID of the
network components of an application are different. In order to overcome this, the AM finds all processes
belonging to an application, and their process identifiers provided only one process ID belonging to the
application. The controller provides the initial process ID to the AM. From our observation, we found that
applications composed of multiple processes have all spawned their processes from the same executable and
have parent-child relationships; as a result, we take advantage of this and bundle the application’s processes
by using their executable path.
In our implementation, given a process ID requested by the controller, the AM uses OpenProcess function
to get the process handle, which is a unique ID given to processes in Windows systems, and with the handle
and GetModuleFileNameEx function, acquires the executable path of the process. Once the executable path
of the requested process is acquired, we use CreateToolHelp32Snapshot to take a snapshot of all running
processes on the system. The snapshot is the read-only copy of the current state of all processes running on
the machine, which includes their process ID. Then we iterate over the snapshot CreateToolHelp32Snapshot
returned and retrieve all the process ID’s of the active processes. Once all the process ID’s are known, we
use the same approach mentioned previously with OpenProcess and GetModuleFileNameEx functions to get
the executable path of all the processes. By comparing the requested process ID’s executable path against
all running processes’ executable paths on the system, we can get all the process ID’s of the application. We
save this information in a vector.
4.1.6 Browser Instrumentation
Web browsers require extensive attention due to their dynamic nature. It is not possible to use the same
approach as desktop applications with browsers because of their ability to load web pages and the number
of network connections they produce due to hyperlinks. As we have explained in Section 3, constructing
policies based on past behavior or handcrafting is not possible, so we construct live policies by intercepting
web-traffic before it reaches the browsers and extract the hyperlinks.
We use the Network Monitor to intercept browser traffic, both inbound and outbound, by monitoring
TCP packets to and from ports 80 and 443, which are ports associated with the HTTP and HTTPS protocol.
We register two callout functions at the transport layer to intercept TCP packets and send the packets to
the Application Monitor. When the Application Monitor receives those packets, it sends the packets to the
Tshark tool for reassembly and decryption. Tshark requires packets to have Ethernet headers to process
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them correctly, but since we intercepted the packets at the transport layer, the Ethernet headers are missing.
We, therefore, constructed Ethernet headers artificially and prepended the header to each packet. We used
pipes to transport the packets between the Application Monitor and Tshark. Once the packets have been
assembled and decrypted by Tshark, the Application Monitor searches the packets for hyperlinks and saves
the hyperlinks in a map data structure with the process ID of the browser as key.
When the browser loads the webpage, which occurs after the Application Monitor extracts all the hyper-
links, the browser will make additional requests to retrieve resources pointed to by the hyperlinks depending
on the user action (e.g., clicking on an article at nytimes.com). The Network Monitor intercepts these ad-
ditional requests and consults the policy engine to make a decision. We compare the requests hostname
against hyperlinks the Application Monitor acquired by intercepting HTTP and HTTPS traffic. Since both
the Network Monitor and Application Monitor save and retrieve data based on process ID, this comparison
is straightforward. If the Application Monitor has observed the requested webpage domain name, we allow
the network request through.
4.1.7 Compression
When the controller requests UI information from the client, it is essential to send consistent and complete
UI information for Harbinger to make correct decisions. However, the maximum amount of information
currently transferable is 1500 bytes. Furthermore, UI Automation represents UI contextual information as
widestrings which takes up 2 bytes, combined with the fact that depth of a trace varies greatly, and with
three traces to send, it is not uncommon for the AM to send incomplete UI information to the controller.
As a result, we implement functionality to compress UI information in the AM and the functionality to
decompress the information in the controller.
We use Huffman Compression, which is a variable-length lossless compression algorithm, due to its
ease of implementation and previous uses in text compression. Huffman compression compresses data with
symbol to symbol replacement, with frequently occurring symbols, in our case UI element information, with
a short encoding, and rare symbols with a long encoding. This algorithm works best when we know the
probability distribution of the symbols to be compressed. For decompression, we perform the symbol to
symbol replacement in reverse order.
In our implementation of Huffman Compression, we set our symbols to be the tuple combination of
UI element’s name, class type, and control type. Furthermore, we make additional changes to the default
compression algorithm by changing the variable-length encoding to fixed-length encoding and added the
ability to deal with symbols unencountered before. As mentioned, the probability distribution of the symbols
to be compressed must be known. Thus, before we start compressing, we calculate the frequency of each
symbol by generating training data for each application, and then we use a Python script to calculate the
frequency of each symbol and generate the symbol to symbol compression file. We use this file as a lookup
table for compression and in reverse lookup fashion for decompression. However, this do not guarantee
28
that we have an accurate representation of the probability distribution of the symbols, nor that we have
encountered all the symbols/UI elements. As a result, our compression and decompression methods take this
into account and does not try to compress or decompress previously unseen symbols. Encountering unseen
symbols is a valid assumption not only because the training data can be incomplete, but also because the
UI might change due to updates, in such a case, we generate the training data again.
4.2 Network Monitor
The network monitor serves two purposes, intercepting network connection at the host system and coor-
dinating the application monitor with the policy engine. We implement the network monitor as a kernel-
mode driver, which uses the Application Layer Enforcement (ALE) provided by Windows Filtering Platform
(WFP) to filter packets on a per-connection or per-socket basis. ALE is also capable of monitoring all socket
activities, such as the creation of TCP and UDP connections.
The Network Monitor registers callout functions to detect new network flows, and uses the inverted call
model [24] to query the application monitor for the GUI data of said flows. While driver routines cannot
directly perform a callback to a user-level application, we can use the inverted call model, which is similar to
registering an event handler. The user-level application registers device control codes that are pending and
accessible by drivers. When a driver wishes to notify the application of some event, the pending control code
is completed. We register callout functions to monitor connect, accept, and close operations of sockets, and
also to intercept TCP packets for the browser instrumentation. We include the process ID of the application
creating the new network flow, so the Application Monitor can return the GUI information associated with
it.
The Network Monitor uses the inverted call module to communicate with the Application Monitor. The
inverted call must include the process ID of the application making the network request, and we acquire
the process ID from the registered callout functions. After the GUI information is retrieved, the network
monitor packages the packet with the GUI information and sends it to the policy engine for an access control
decision; all subsequent packets are queued in the network monitor until the policy engine returns a decision.
If the policy engine denies the flow, the network monitor discards all subsequent queued packets, and it also
drops any future packets in that flow associated with the application. If the policy engine approves the flow,
the network monitor re-injects all the queued packets and marks the flow as approved in the WFP.
In an enterprise setting, all network monitors and machines will communicate with a centralized controller
that manages the policy engine. We have set the size of the packets between the network monitor and the
controller to be 15000 byte MTU to avoid packet segmentation or fragmentation. Therefore, the controller can
make quick decisions because there is no need to reassemble the packets. Harbinger uses the OpenFlow 1.0
protocol to communicate with the controller and policy-engine for compatibility purposes with a software-
defined network [23]. The network monitor can communicate with multiple controllers for access control
decisions to account for network failure between the network monitor and the controller. Harbinger can
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communicate with an arbitrary number of controllers, choosing one as the primary and the rest as backup
controllers. In case communication with the primary controller is lost, the network monitor switches to a
backup controller for access control decisions.
4.3 Policy Engine
Our policy engine receives information collected by the Application and Network monitors at each host
machine and saves them in a local database. When the policy engine receives a new network request, it
consults the event traces received from the application in reverse chronological order to arrive at a decision.
We examine traces in reverse order because user behavior can be nonlinear, such as switching between
applications or multitasking. Clients only report the three most recent event traces (GUI traces) to the policy
engine because older traces are likely to be irrelevant to the application’s most recent network behavior.
The policy engine creates policies offline based on the collected information periodically. Therefore,
when the policy engine receives a network request, the policies governing the access control decisions are
pre-defined. The policies are saved in a backend MySQL database and implemented as a rule cache that is
refreshed periodically. A policy rule includes network and transport fields such as IP address, protocol, and
hostname, as well as process path and process ID, and UI information. Policies also have a priority field,
which indicates the importance of the policy, and the controller makes flow decisions according to the highest
priority matching policy. We also added a wildcards for coarse-grain matching. The controller writes to a
buffer each time we make a decision, and we periodically save the information to the backend database.
We create two types of policies to encompass software-defined and user-specified network activity. An
application’s network behavior stays relatively constant if they are software-defined, so the same UI elements
always trigger the same network activity. We can create policies for this type of network behavior by observing
past UI activities and their corresponding network activity. We observe the number of consecutive network
connections the same GUI trace makes and the timestamps (temporal distance) of those connections to create
the policies. Due to DNS caching and the availability of computing resources at the end-user’s machine, the
number of network connections and the temporal distance between them may vary. Therefore, we create
policies with upper and lower bounds on the number of connections a GUI trace can make and the temporal
distance between the activation of the element and the network activity. We do not take the same approach
when creating policies for user-specified network destinations because we cannot predict them based on past
behavior because the user can provide previously unseen destination. We tackle this problem by observing
the relationships between the GUI field and other fields such as the destination IP and hostname to create
handcrafted policies. Our policy engine implements a handcrafted policy for handling hyperlinks as an
example. The handcrafted policy searches if the destination hostname is present in the GUI field, as this
would happen when the user clicks on a hyperlink. In such a case, the handcrafted policy would allow the
network activity. This single handcrafted policy works across the applications we are testing and is a proof
of concept.
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We create the policies using a Python script and with the data saved in the backend database from
observing each end-user. The data output as a text file so that our Python script can parse and create policies.
We use Pandas, NumPy, and regular expression libraries for indexing and comparing UI fields[36, 22, 28].
Our Python script searches for consecutive traces with matching UI fields and creates a single policy for
that event. The policy has additional fields for lower and upper bounds for keyboard and mouse activity
and timestamps. We observe the bounds from the consecutive traces. The policy rules look similar to
traditional firewall rules with additional fields, including UI context information and executable path, and a
field indicating the approve or deny order. If our policy engine does not find a matching policy for a network
request, we deny it by default.
5 Experiment environment
We performed the security and performance evaluations on virtual machines running on separate physical
VM hosting servers. The policy engine and the controller ran on Ubuntu 16.04 VM, which was allocated
1 core and 2 Gbytes of RAM on a machine with 12-cores and 64 Gbytes of RAM. We run the applications
under test on Windows 7, which was allocated with 2 cores and 4 Gbytes of RAM. Furthermore, during
testing, one controller and 5 virtual machines running Windows 7 were used.
5.1 Application Under Test
We decide to test applications that are commonly found in enterprise settings, as we built Harbinger for
detecting intrusions in an enterprise network. However, we cannot test every prominent application used
in an office setting, so we choose to pick applications that would represent a whole class of applications in
enterprise settings. We chose Microsoft Word, Powerpoint, Excel, and Onenote to represent office suites
commonly used for processing documents, creating slideshows, calculating spreadsheets, and sharing notes,
respectively. With this, we can represent a myriad of applications without testing each.
5.2 Automatic generation of UI activity
To perform a security evaluation, we need to produce and collect training and test data that would represent
normal usage of an application under enterprise settings. Furthermore, we must make sure that user activity
which occurs during the collection of the test data also occurs during the collection of the training data
because we cannot judge user activity we have not seen before. To generate a sufficient quantity of such
data would be error-prone and tedious if it were to be performed by people; as a result, a tool that mimics
user behavior is appropriate.
Sikuli is a tool which was developed for the purpose of testing the GUI portion of applications by
mimicking user behavior by automating any interaction the user may have with the visible portion of the
screen [32]. It uses image recognition to identify GUI components and interacts with them by controlling
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the mouse and keyboard through software means. This tool fits our needs perfectly not only because of its
ability to mimic user behavior but allows us to create user behaviors for each application without the need
for access to each application’s source code.
For each application under test, we create dozens of GUI traces. A trace could be thought of as a natural
progression of GUI activity such as mouse clicks and key presses which achieve a single purpose such as
searching for an image or printing a document. For example, to print a document in Microsoft Word from
its homepage, first, the user would need to click on the File tab positioned at the top of the Word GUI, then
on the Print tab located at the left side, and finally the Print button. This action achieves one goal/trace
but is a combination of multiple user activity. Furthermore, traces created for each application fall under
two categories, ones that produce network activity and ones which do not. We have decided to include both
types because users do not exclusively follow one type of traces over the other. However, there is difficulty
in convincingly mimicking user behavior because of the rigidity of software-generated traces in timing and
order. To overcome this difficulty, we introduce randomness in the choice of trace and the variability between
traces and the actions within traces in the form of random number generator and random timer. We have
decided that a single run of Sikuli test script would be composed of roughly 10 random traces per application,
excluding the traces required for starting and ending the execution of said application. For training and test
data collection, we executed the test script consecutively over the course of a week and two days, respectively.
6 Security Evaluation
To test the effectiveness of the IDS, we conduct three different experiments with changes to the behavior of the
Sikuli test script and the mock-malicious DLL to simulate changes in user behavior and the attacker’s goals
respectively. Furthermore, to prove the value of using both UI activity and traditional network information
as opposed to only traditional network information, the same greedy matching algorithm is used to make
security decisions in both cases. As a result, direct comparison of detection rates will be valid and shed light
on the importance of UI contextual information.
When evaluating Harbinger, we have two main scenarios to consider: 1) a deterministic network desti-
nation and 2) a user-supplied network destination. Deterministic destinations do not change based on the
end-user’s behavior or the environment. They are pre-configured within the application by the end-user
or the organization in advance. Changes in deterministic destination usually occurs when the application
is updated, or the IT staff configures them manually. These changes are infrequent, and, therefore, pre-
configured destinations remain constant for some time. User-supplied network destinations are provided
during run time by the user, usually in the form of URLs. Thus, they can be considered to be in a constant
state of flux until the application makes the network request. These two scenarios are the complete opposites
of each other. The security evaluation section will discuss how Harbinger utilizes different approaches to
building whitelists, that function well in both scenarios. We discuss the policy creation for each approach
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in-depth and compare and contrast the security performance of each policy class.
6.1 Policy Classes
We create three different classes of whitelists, which we differentiate according to the features taken into
consideration when we created the policies. The reason for differentiating policies according to their features
is to highlight the importance of them when creating policies, and the insight the GUI field offers.
1. Class 1: Traditional IP Whitelists. We construct the first class of whitelist the same way tra-
ditional firewalls construct whitelists. These whitelists are created based on the standard five-tuple
(IPsrc, IPdest, transport protocol, portsrc, portdest). In this case, the source IP address is fixed with
random source ports, thus effectively focusing on destination IP addresses and port numbers. We
consider the performance of this whitelist to be the baseline because of its resemblance to traditional
firewalls.
2. Class 2: DNS Whitelists with User and Application Path. We construct the second class of
whitelists based on the standard five-tuples with the addition of domain name resolution and application
path. This additional contextual information allows Harbinger to make decisions based on which
application initiates the network connection and whether IP addresses point to the same domain. In
this case, we focus on destination IP, Port, DNS, and application path. This class of whitelist highlights
the contribution to security offered by Harbinger’s extra visibility on the host system. However, we do
not include the contextual information offered by the user in the form of GUI.
3. Class 3: Dynamic Whitelists with User Inputs and GUI Data. We construct the third class of
whitelist by leveraging the full contextual information Harbinger has access to on the host system. The
additional contextual information provides detailed GUI data, mouse clicks, keypresses, in addition to
those available to the second class. This GUI data will sufficiently prove their usefulness as they give
access to hyperlinks and buttons, which may cause network traffic.
We use a confusion matrix for comparison to determine the effectiveness of each class of whitelists. The
matrix lists how much benign and malicious traffic each class of policy correctly classifies and misclassifies.
6.2 Policy generation
Before running any experiments, we monitor baseline activities of the applications devoid of user interactions.
We believe recording such activity allows Harbinger to know about connections that run in the background
regardless of user interaction. We do not want to create policies which incorrectly infer background network
activity to be caused by the end-user. Therefore, we must differentiate between background and user-initiated
network activities. We collected background network activity by starting each application and monitoring
its network traffic over some time. We use the baseline data for constructing BaseLine Whitelists for all
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three classes and each application. We do not take into consideration the GUI field when creating whitelists
for background activity, and any activity to destinations in the BaseLine Whitelists are allowed. In Class
1 Baseline Whitelist, we only whitelisted the destination IP addresses. In Class 2 and Class 3 Baseline
Whitelists, we whitelisted both the destination IP addresses and destination hostnames.
In addition to Baseline Whitelists, we create whitelists which covers network activity caused by the end-
user. We use a training phase in which we programmaticaly simulate user interactions with each application
under test to generate the training data. We then use a greedy algorithm to create application-specific
whitelists that allow all network activity in the training data for each application. We focused on creating
tight policies when possible specifying the exact destinations, but for properties which vary such as source
port numbers, we use wildcards. We do not perform packet analysis because packets are usually encrypted
and can be modified by the adversary.
In Class 1 whitelists, we allow network traffic to any destination IP address observed in the training data
and the BaseLine Whitelist. In Class 2 whitelists, we allow network traffic to any destination IP address
or hostname that occurs in either the training data or the BaseLine Whitelist. We deny the network traffic
otherwise.
In Class 3 Whitelists we allow network traffic 1) if the destination IP address or DNS is observed in
the BaseLine Whitelists or DNS Pinning Whitelist (described below), 2) if the destination hostname or IP
address appears as a GUI substring in the form of a URL in the GUI data, or 3) if either the destination
DNS or IP address observed in the training data appears with its corresponding GUI string. Browsers cache
the IP address associated with hostnames for performance purposes and to defend against DNS binding
attacks. This technique is called DNS pinning [14]. Our policy script saves the associated IP address of DNS
hostnames, which appeared in the training data with the corresponding GUI field to create DNS pinning
Whitelist. For any future occurrence of the corresponding GUI field, we match it with its DNS hostname,
IP address, or DNS pinned IP address. For such occurrences, we allow the network traffic. We deny network
traffic unable to meet any of the above criteria.
6.3 Experimental Setup
We examined the performance of the three different classes of whitelists on traffic from four desktop ap-
plications representing their specific classes of application: Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft
PowerPoint, Microsoft Word. We interacted with the applications using the Sikuli framework [37]. For each
application, we provided application-specific workflows that include a variety of traces that generate network
traffic and ones that do not, with differing mouse and keyboard activity. We hoped to emulate the end-user
behavior by randomizing the order of workflows, the pause between workflows, and the number of mouse
clicks and keypresses. The workflows may be fully deterministic or provide user-supplied destinations from
a list depending on the experiment. The setup is sufficient to emulate uncompromised applications to test
Harbinger for usability with false-positive rates.
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Table 1: Confusion matrices for the three whitelist classes across our three experiments.
Experiment 1: Deterministic legitimate destinations with adversary connections to destinations not in the training data
Baseline Training Testing True Positives True Negatives False Positives False Negatives
Application Samples Samples Samples Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Excel 4,173 3,425 3,446 956 956 956 2,464 2,489 2,487 26 1 3 0 0 0
OneNote 1,764 1,690 2,439 794 794 794 1,641 1,645 1,645 4 0 0 0 0 0
PowerPoint 2,366 792 2,392 721 721 721 1,573 1,670 1,670 98 1 1 0 0 0
Word 3,826 2,809 2,655 560 560 560 2,022 2,095 2,091 74 0 4 0 0 0
Experiment 2: Deterministic legitimate destinations with adversary connections to destinations contained within the training data
Baseline Training Testing True Positives True Negatives False Positives False Negatives
Application Samples Samples Samples Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Excel 4,173 3,425 3,446 0 0 940 2,464 2,489 2,487 26 1 3 956 956 16
OneNote 1,764 1,690 2,439 0 0 794 1,641 1,645 1,645 4 0 0 794 794 0
PowerPoint 2,366 792 2,392 0 0 702 1,573 1,670 1,670 98 1 1 721 721 19
Word 3,826 2,809 2,655 0 0 540 2,022 2,095 2,091 74 0 4 560 560 20
Experiment 3: User-supplied legitimate destinations with adversary connections to destinations not in the training data
Baseline Training Testing True Positives True Negatives False Positives False Negatives
Application Samples Samples Samples Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Excel 5,419 3,733 1,958 644 644 644 714 736 1,311 600 578 3 0 0 0
OneNote 1,913 1,929 1,025 541 541 541 462 482 482 22 2 2 0 0 0
PowerPoint 4,427 1,249 1,652 559 559 559 477 493 1,091 616 600 2 0 0 0
Word 6,002 4,273 1,486 370 370 370 548 555 1,116 568 561 0 0 0 0
In order to mimic malicious behavior, we would need to compromise the applications under test. The
method of compromise would need to be valid for all applications we intend to test and have the ability
to make network connections arbitrarily. As a result, we have chosen DLL injection as our method of
compromise. DLL injection, a technique used for running arbitrary code in the address space of a target
application by injecting the code as a dynamically linked library. This technique is commonly used by
malicious individuals to compromise applications [2]. We used a DLL injecter developed by a third party
while designing our own malicious DLL code to be injected into the applications. The code we injected will
attempt to make a network connection to an arbitrary IP address every 15 seconds if a random number
generator generates a specific number. Depending on the experiment, the injected DLL will either attempt
to initiate network traffic to benign or malicious IP addresses. We are emulating propagation attacks when
the DLL attempts to connect to a benign IP address, and we are emulating attempts to reach a command
and control center when the DLL attempts to connect to a malicious IP address. In the confusion matrix
of our security evaluation, we consider any network traffic initiated by the injected DLL as malicious (true
positive) regardless of the destination and all other traffic as benign (true negative).
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6.4 Experiment 1: Deterministic Legitimate Destinations with Command and
Control Server
Our first experiment is the simplest one with user workflows having deterministic destinations like the case
in which the “Wikipedia” button in Microsoft Word always resolves to a connection to the same server. In
this experiment, the adversary only attempts to initiate network connections to priori unknown hosts outside
the organization. This scenoria emulates attempts such as exfiltrating enterprise data to an outside server,
downloading additional malicious software, or just attempting to connect to a command and controller server.
The adversary’s destinations are not known priori, so it is not feasible for the defenders to create a blacklist
policies. However, our approach of whitelisting prior known IP address are likely to succeed in detecting the
malicious traffic because the destinations of the malicious traffic are not present in the baseline or training
data. In other words, the destination is not part of the organization’s IT infrastructure, so detection should
be easy.
The top section of Table 1 shows the results of experiment 1. Each application in experiment 1 had at
the minimum 1,764 network connections in the baseline data, 792 network connections in the training data,
and 2,392 network connections in test data. As expected, the false negatives are zero for each class because
the malicious destination IP addresses do not exist in the baseline and training data, thus did not appear
in the whitelists. However, the false-positive rates differ. The Class 1 whitelists have the worst performance
due to IP load balancing, a scenario in which the hostname is the same, but the associated IP addresses vary.
In some of the cases, the destination IP address or the destination hostname is not present in the baseline
whitelists, and it affected the performance of all three classes. In Class 3, we see that false-positive rates for
Excel and Word are more in Class 2. This was caused by incorrectly associating UI activity with background
network traffic and could be remedied with more extensive baseline data collection. Nonetheless, the Class 3
whitelists performed adequately across applications with false positives rates between 0% and 0.2% percent.
All three classes of whitelists have 100% detection rate, but Class 1 whitelists may have usability issues
because of its higher false-positive rates than Class 2 and Class 3 whitelists.
6.5 Experiment 2: Deterministic Legitimate Destinations with Propagation At-
tack
Our second experiment is similar to the first experiment except the fact that the adversary changes strategy.
While in Experiment 1, the adversary tries to connect to an outside infrastructure, in Experiment 2, the
adversary tries to propagate within the enterprise’s infrastructure. In other words, the adversary targets
benign IP addresses to make network connections. In order to emulate this scenario, we did not collect
additional data but simply rewrote the destination IP addresses made by the injected DLL to random ones
observed in the training data set. We did not choose destination addresses from the baseline data set
because these addresses tend to be manufacturer-operated. In summary, the adversary targets enterprise’s
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IT infrastructure. The policy matching approaches used in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are the same.
The middle section of Table 1 shows the results of Experiment 2. The results differ significantly from
Experiment 1, especially in the case for Class 1 and Class 2, as they fail to detect any of the malicious traffic,
due to the injected DLL targeting whitelisted IP addresses. As a result, Class 1 and Class 2 have true-positive
rates of 0 and 100% false-negative rates. However, unlike Class 1 and Class 2, Class 3 performs markedly well
with 0% to 3.6% false-negative rates. This is due to the fact that, while the adversary may provide benign
IP address or DNS as destinations, they fail to provide the corresponding GUI string associated with the
destinations. However, the false-negative rates are not 0% because some of the adversary’s attempts were
able to make connections at opportune times where the associated GUI activity with the destination occurred
recently. The false-positive rates of Class 3 shows no changes. A more intelligent adversary may try to time
their attacks when the associated GUI activity of the destination occurred recently. The adversary could
accomplish this feat by monitoring the GUI, just like Harbinger. To combat the above scenario, Harbinger
keeps a stateful connection-counting system for policies; therefore, the extra malicious network activity can
be detected.
6.6 Experiment 3: User-Supplied Legitimate Destinations with Malicious Com-
mand and Control Server
Our third experiment reveals a further advantage Harbinger holds over more traditional approaches. In this
experiment, we explore the capabilities of Harbinger when the end-user dynamically sets the destination
during runtime, via a URL. To collect the data for this experiment, we modified the Sikuli script to type
a URL in the type field of the application and, subsequently, accessing the URL in the typed field. We
choose the URL randomly from a database containing the most popular half-million websites, according to
Quentcast [31]. This experiment is designed to evaluate the capability of dynamic whitelists, so no changes
were made to the behavior of the adversary from Experiment 1, meaning the adversary chose to connect to
destinations, not in the baseline or training sets. Each application typed and clicked on between 240 and
420 URLs in the training set, and between 149 and 390 URLs in the test set.
The results of the experiment are shown on the bottoms section of Table 1. We again see 0% false-
negative rates, the same as Experiment 1, because the adversary chose destinations absent in the whitelists.
However, we see markedly different results when it comes to true negatives and false-positive rates. The
Class 1 and Class 2 approaches to constructing whitelists correctly classify between 44% and 55% of network
connection. The correctly classified network activity was destined for Microsoft authentication service,
which was present in the Baseline Whitelists. However, almost all network traffic caused by URL clicks,
were misclassified due to its absence in the baseline or training sets. Class 3 outperforms Class 1 and Class
2 significantly with accuracy between 99.6% and 100% across applications because the GUI string contains
the contextual information necessary for extracting the destination hostnames.
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6.7 Security Evaluation Results
The three experiments conducted show that application paths and DNS data are useful for correctly classi-
fying pre-configured or pre-programmed benign and previously unseen malicious network activity. However,
further information is needed to construct whitelists for correctly classifying destinations provided by the
end-user and detecting propagation of malicious activity inside an organization’s infrastructure. We see
this from the false-positive rates exceeding 50% and false-negative rates of 100% for Class 1 and Class 2.
The required contextual information can be provided by monitoring user GUI activity, which can provide
information regarding end-user provided destinations, via URLs, and restricting network activity to benign
destinations by requiring destinations to be associated with its corresponding GUI activity. We see the use-
fulness of said information from the results of class 3 whitelists, with false-positive rates and false negative
rates between 0% and 0.4% and 0% and 3.6% respectively across applications and experiments.
6.8 Direct Attacks on Harbinger
Harbinger components are secure from direct attacks under our threat model because the adversary only
operates with user-level privileges. As a result, the adversary is not able to directly tamper with or stop
admin-level and kernel-level processes. Specifically, the Network Monitor is a kernel-level process, and the
Application Monitor is an admin-level process, so they cannot be compromised by the adversary. The Policy
Engine is located on a remote server, so malware residing on the host system is not able to compromise it
as it would need to initiate network traffic to do so. In which case, Harbinger will detect the adversary.
7 Performance Evaluation
We examine the performance of Harbinger by evaluating 1) the end-to-end delay introduced by the controller,
which includes the time required to consult the policy engine, and 2) the stress the application monitor puts
on the end-user’s system while monitoring user behavior and collecting GUI information. Our experiments
showed that end-to-end delay introduced by the need to consult the controller is negligible with median
delay less than 3 milliseconds, and the application monitor does not introduce noticeable overhead to the
end-user with delays less than 65 milliseconds for the most complicate application we tested. We describe
the experiments and the outcome more in detail below.
7.1 Network Monitor and Policy Engine
We use ALE layer in WFP to intercept network packets at the host’s kernel. We use ALE to intercept
packets in a flow and make decision per flow, not per packet. As a result, once we approve a flow, we do
not need to classify all subsequent packets belonging to that flow. Our network monitor elevates each flow
to the policy engine for a decision and enforces the decision locally in the host’s ALE classifier. As a result,
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the overhead associated with Harbinger concerns only the first packet of the flow and its query to the policy
engine.
The overhead associated with network monitor requires us to monitor end-to-end latency introduced by
Harbinger, which is the time between when the first packet of a flow reaches the network monitor to the
time spend waiting a response from the policy engine. As a result, we can consider the end-to-end latency
as the sum of the delay introduced by the network monitor and the policy engine. The local processing time
of the first packet of a flow includes queuing the packet, adding an OpenFlow header, adding contextual
information, updating the status of the flow once receiving the policy engine’s decision, and reinjecting the
packet back into the packet queue. These operations are not computationally intensive, proven by our end-
to-end delay results shown below. The delay associated with querying the policy engine, which is located on
a separate machine, depends on network conditions and time spent matching policies at the policy engine.
The delay will be independent of the origin of the packet. We conduct the experiment using an in-LAN
policy engine because this will most closely resemble enterprise conditions.
To measure the performance results introduced by the network monitor and the policy engine, we used
the KeQueryPerformanceCounter function, which is a kernel-level routine used to acquire high-resolution
timing. The KeQueryPerformanceCounter routine returns the current value of the performance counter
since the system was booted. The routine takes one argument and fills the argument with the frequency of
the performance counter. Once we retrieve both values, we divide the performance counter by the frequency
counter. Doing so returns the elapsed time since the system was booted, with an accuracy of 100 nanoseconds
or roughly 0.1-microsecond resolution. Since we only measure the performance of the network monitor, we
exclude all interactions the network monitor may have with the application monitor to a simple return
statement. We use the experimental environment as described in Section 5. When measuring performance,
we interacted with Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft PowerPoint, Microsoft Visual Studio, Google
Chrome, Internet Explorer, Mozilla, Firefox, Slack, Skype, and PyCharm.
Figure 4 shows the experiment results of the end-to-end delay introduced by the controller in the form
of a cumulative distribution function (CDF). Furthermore, the two lines shown in the CDF represent cases
in which a GUI was present and not. The end-to-end delay for both cases when there is an absence, and the
presence of GUI was under 3 milliseconds for the majority of the flows, with all flows with an empty GUI
traces completed under 6 milliseconds, and 95% of those with GUI traces completed under 6 milliseconds.
These overheads are not enough to be perceivable by the end-user [20].
We ran a total of 653,189 trials in which the network monitor intercepted the first flow of the packet,
queried the policy engine for a verdict, and reinjected the packet into the queue. We excluded the 0.17%
of the data, which is 1,125 of the trials, because they exceeded the mean by a factor of six, thus considered
outliers. It is unlikely for the network monitor the cause these situations because the outliers constitute
less than 0.5% of the trials. Thus, we conclude that poor network conditions to be the likely cause. From
the experimental results, we observed the end-to-end delay to be roughly 835 miscroseconds. The biggest
39
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f T
ria
ls
Overall End-to-End Delay (milliseconds)
GUI Empty
GUI Present
Figure 4: CDF of end-to-end delay introduced by Harbinger on new flows. There were 743 (43 outliers
removed) traces with GUI information and 765 (34 outliers removed) traces with no GUI information.
contributing factors to the delay were the encryption of the response, decryption of the query, parsing
GUI contextual information, and finding a matching policy rule. They consistute 290 microseconds, 159
microseconds, 117 microseconds, and 76 microseconds, respectively. The policy engine currently constitutes
31 rules, and with the addition of more rules, the consultation delay may increase.
7.2 Application Monitor
Harbingers’s application monitor introduces two types of overheads: 1) the overhead introduced when mon-
itoring UI activity 2) and the overhead introduced when the network monitor requests UI information. The
overhead when monitoring UI activity is caused by hooks and event handlers, which are triggered when the
end-user interacts with the system’s GUI. While the event handler runs concurrently with the application,
thus not affecting user experience, the mouse and keyboard hooks start and finish execution before the
application, so a high latency could hinder user experience.
To measure the performance of each hook and event handler, we used the C++ high-resolution clock
API, which can measure time in nanoseconds. When monitoring UI activity, the hooks and the event handler
traverses the GUI tree upwards from the activated element the root element. As a result, the overhead of UI
activity monitoring may be highly dependent on the depth and complexity of the GUI tree and the library
used for constructing the applications GUI. As a result, we decided to test 3 applications 1) Notepad, a text
editor with a simple GUI, 2) Notepad++, a text editor with a moderately complex GUI, and 3) Microsoft
Word, a word processor with a complex GUI. Furthermore, comparing these applications seem fair because
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Figure 5: CDF of the time required for the AM to retrieve GUI information from applications. The Notepad
and Notepad++ lines are mostly overlapping in the graph. The Notepad application had 1,731 runs, with
30 outliers removed. Notepad++ had 1,191 runs, with 63 outliers removed. Microsoft Word had 1,310 runs,
with 1 outlier removed.
their primary purpose is editing text. In each application, we monitor and save a minimum of 1,191 GUI
traces.
In Figure 5, we show the results of the experiment of each application. As can be seen from the Figure,
both notepad and notepad++’s hooks and event handlers completed the acquisition of GUI elements under
12 milliseconds. However, for Microsoft Word, the acquisition took under 50 milliseconds for 80% of the
GUI traces and under 65 milliseconds for over 95% of the GUI traces. From the results, we observe that
the overhead is not affected by the complexity of the GUI but depends on what library the developers
used when constructing the application’s GUI. We observe this behavior from the fact that both notepad
and notepad++ used the same GUI library, but notepad++’s has a more complex GUI than notepad.
Common sense would lead us to believe that notepad++ should have higher latency in GUI acquisition,
but in actuality, the overhead for both applications was similar. On the other hand, Microsoft Word’s GUI,
developed with a different GUI library, has a larger latency in GUI acquisition than either notepad and
notepad++. Nonetheless, for even the most complex application, Microsoft Word, GUI elements can be
quickly retrieved.
The other overhead introduced by the application monitor occurs when the network monitor requests GUI
information from the application monitor. The application monitor stores GUI information in a vector class
provided by the C++ stand library, so retrieval of GUI information by the network monitor is application
agnostic. We used the C++ high-resolution API clock to measure the overhead. We ran 1,383 trials, and
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Figure 6: CDF of the time required to retrieve GUI element cached GUI elements across 1,383 trials. We
removed 4 outliers.
we show the results in Figure 6. We see that 95% of requests completed under 0.23 milliseconds.
7.3 Performance Evaluation Results
From the experiment, we see that Harbinger introduces small amounts of delay when it comes to both the
network monitor and application monitor that is imperceptible to the end-user. The end-to-end delay of
acquiring saved GUI information, consulting the network monitor, and enacting the decision of the network
monitor is under 6 milliseconds in 95% of the cases. The application monitor’s overhead when monitoring
and acquiring GUI information while the end-user interacts with the GUI of event complex applications
takes under 65 milliseconds in 95% of the cases. With such overheads, it will not hinder network traffic nor
the end-user’s experience when interacting with the GUI.
8 Discussion and Limitations
In this section, we discuss the limitations of Harbinger and further possible improvements. Specifically,
we discuss generalizing our approach to other operating systems and applications; furthermore, we discuss
limitation of inferring network activity in-depth.
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8.1 Generalization and Limitations
We developed Harbinger for Microsoft Windows due to its ubiquitous use in enterprise settings. With the
capabilities of UI Automation framework, we were able to monitor UI activity without extensive engineering
effort. For other operating systems, we have not found a similar framework; as a result, to generalize our
approach across operating systems, instrumentation of GUI libraries may be required. We do not believe this
is a major concern as the market share of Windows operating systems is 80% followed by macOS with 20%,
Linux around with 2%, and the rest shared among less common operating systems. The only limitation we
experience with UI Automation is its inability to acquire UI elements from applications developed in Java
due to Java applications using the Java Swing library to develop its GUI. To instrument Java applications,
we would probably need to use accessibility framework developed for Java applications.
For performance measurements of the Application Monitor, we have tested three text editing applications.
When using UI Automation, we have not experienced noticeable delays with the following applications:
Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Notepad, Pycharm, Chrome, Edge, Firefox. However, we believe that further
testing is neccesary to support our claim with data. We do not believe testing every application in Windows
is necessary, but testing a chosen few developed in GUI libraries that represent a vast portion of applications
will suffice. Our performance of the Network Monitor should closely resemble the deployment in enterprise
settings, and the only significant change might be the number of polices the Policy Engine might need to
consult.
8.2 Inference
Harbinger uses temporal proximity of UI actions and their corresponding network activity to infer causal
links. However, direct observation may be necessary for our approach to work with applications that use
helper processes to delegate network activity. For example, some applications may use Microsoft Windows’s
built-int DNS functionality to resolve DNS lookups, which the Service Host process (svchost.exe) provides.
As a result, there is no way to infer the causal link between an application and its DNS lookups. To tackle
this problem, we would need to observe the inter-process communication between client and service processes
directly. With the appropriate instrumentation, it is feasible but requires significant engineering efforts, as
clients may use a multitude of inter-process communication methods including but not limited to ports,
pipes, and shared memory. Furthermore, such an instrumentation would introduce further complexity and
performance overheads.
9 Conclusion
In this thesis, we have explored the usability of dynamically created whitelists for classifying network traffic.
We have found that with the help of GUI contextual information, we were able to support user-generated
network traffic that was previously unseen and create more fine-grained policies. Furthermore, our approach
43
was feasible with moderate engineering efforts and capable of cross-application support on Windows operating
systems. From our experiments, we found that our approach introduced minimal overhead with false positive
and false negative rates better than traditional firewalls using the same greedy algorithm.
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